The prime duty of a doctor or a nurse is towards the welfare of his or her patient. This may at times involve not officiously keeping the patient alive, but it does not and cannot extend to deliberate killing of our patients or to killing selected individuals.
Every patient must have complete confidence in his doctor or nurse. This must be absolute. How can it be so if the patient may be able to ask himself whenever the doctor or nurse enters the room, is this man going to kill me? Is the injection the nurse is about to administer going to bring death?
The young doctor and the young nurse takes up his or her profession with the commendable object of helping patients. Are we to tell them that part of their duties will be to kill patients ? This is what I mean when I say that as doctors we can have nothing to do with legalized euthanasia. That is the beginning and end of it. We must have nothing to do with it.
If the state wants to introduce euthanasia then the state must not expect to find doctors and nurses ready and willing to do the unpleasant job for them. As was said recently in the House of Lords: 'Let them get someone else to do their dirty work.'
As a senior member of the profession I feel that I have a duty to try and clarify this issue, to define what should be the medical approach to it. The doctor's position should be made clear and definite: that he just cannot accept planned euthanasia as part of his duties as a doctor.
It is a false argument, and a cruelly misleading argument, to suggest that, in the more liberal attitude to life, and indeed to death, that we see around us in our so-called permissive society, we are not being realistic if we fail to accept the justification for euthanasia. We may accept the need for euthanasia on social grounds but we cannot accept that doctors should implement it.
Doctors are human and they are liable to be influenced by non-medical arguments. These may be political, social, religious and so on. Under these nonmedical influences doctors may feel that it is right, even realistic or forward-looking to do certain things that are not acceptable on medical ethical grounds. As the crudest example I remind you of what some doctors in Hitler's Germany were persuaded to do. Some doctors will always be found willing to implement a policy or practice based on nonmedical grounds, for example on social grounds. I must repeat my warning that if euthanasia becomes legalized a huge and complex mechanism will be necessary to implement and control it. It may be easy to sit in an armchair and agree to it or to stand at a rostrum and declaim it, but when you come to practical implementation the problems appear.tThese have so far not even been contemplated in legislation, and I suspect if any government decided to introduce or to support legislation the actual mechanism involved would deter them.
We must recognize that some doctors will always be found to do such things, but I cannot accept that the supporters of euthanasia can expect their plans to be implemented by doctors and nurses. Perhaps they will themselves be the first volunteers for the job. If not, public executioners or practitioners of euthanasia will have to be appointed. I can only hope that no doctor or nurse will volunteer, though I fear that some would do so. I remind you that in our population of some fifty million we have many who could with propriety accept the task of legal killing. Our forty or fifty thousand doctors should have enough to do to help their patients in many other ways.
One more thing disturbs me. The recent Bill before the House of Lords was for voluntary euthanasia, which many supported. One noble Lord made an emotional speech about his three aunts, two of whom ruined their lives by caring for their sister who was a helpless imbecile and who actually outlived them. But to have destroyed this child would not have been possible under the bill for voluntary euthanasia. The passionate plea for this type of case indicated, as we all must know, that the next step would be involuntary euthanasia-euthanasia by direction. I remind you of Kipling's verse about the road to En-dor:
'Oh! The road to En-dor is the oldest road and the craziest road ofall! Straight it goes to the witch's abode As it did in the days of Saul. And nothing is changed of the sorrow in store For such as go down on the road to En-dor.' We should be careful about setting our feet on the road to En-dor lest we plunge down the slippery slope to much sorrow.
Professor Glanville Williams (Jesus College, Cambridge)
Let us go back to fundamentals. Why is murder a crime? I know that some will give a religious answer, or a mystical answer. They will say that life is a gift of God, and only God can take it away; or they will say that murder is absolutely wrong and must be punished for that reason alone. But most of us now agree that purely religious or metaphysical views are not a sufficient basis for the criminal law. We have to find mundane justifications, and in this instance they come re040* to mind. The reasons underlying the law of rder e partular applications of the reason underlying the whole of our secular morality: utilitarianism and empathy.
The uilitrian reason for the crime of murder is that if nrrder were allowed there would be a genralsen of fear and inserity, which would not only be evil in itself but would in its consequences work disaster for civilization. It is becaus of our conerm to protect people from fea that no responsible petson proposes the euthanasia of ll disrdered people, or of thosem old peons' homes. Such apracticewould produce an intolerable sense of insecurity in hoptals, institutions and the whole community.
The second reason for forbidding murder is elipathiy, or sympathetic identifiction with the victim. We are able i y to put ourselves in the victim's place. Murder is the most heinous peace-time crime because death is what we generall most fear for ourselves, and therefore what we most deplore on behalf of other people. If we hontly thought that rape was a fate worse than death we should make rape a worse crime than murder: we do not think this, and so we do not dothis.
We idi even with babies, and that is why we frid the klling of babies even though babies feel no sanse of inscurity and though there may be more ofthem in the world than we can well do with If we seek population control, it is by other moans. Now, neither of these two secular reasons for the law of murder stands in the way of mercy cillig. To accelerate the death of a patient at his request for nmriful reasons does not increase the sum of human suffering, but dimins it. Sympathy, so far from requirig us to refrain from killin may in exceptional circumstances compel us to do so. I agree with Lord Brock that this question of mercy killing or euthanasia is not specifically a medical question. It affects doctors, but it is a neral mora problem, and it is intimately connected with the right ofsuicide.
The Christian horror of suicide is not Biblical in origin. It goes back to St Augustine of Hippo, who was affected by the fact that many Christias of his time jumped over cliffs, or othewise made away with themselves, in order to avoid the spirtually fatal temptations of life. Because he very n ly desired to combat this decimation of true belevers, Augustine taught that suicide was a sin gater than any that could be avoided by ommittng i. His teaching made a profound impression on subsequent opinion. The assumed wrongness of suicide was socially expressed in every possible way. Indignities were inflicted on the body of the suicide; his estate was forfeited, to the impoverishment of his family; and the person who attempted suicide was punihd This last uinds continued until the Suide Act 1961, which enacted that suicide should no longer be a crime.
The Act does not altogether efface the religious view of suicide, because it expressly continues a considerable measure ofresponsibility forpesons other than the suicide or would-be sude himself. Any one who assists or counsels suicide or atempted suicide can be severely punised, though only on a prosecution instituted with the consent ofthe Director of Publc Prosetions. In practice, no prosecutions have taken plae for this offence. There are between 5,000 and 6,000 successful suicides a year, together with many attmpted suicides, and some of these e very likely assisted, by way of suicide pact or otherwise; but nothing is now heard of it in the courts.
Perhaps the Director of Public Prosecutions exercises a we discretion. It is not clear what course he would take if a doctor assisted his patient's suicide, and if the facts came out and received wide publicity.
Why should we continue to subject the suicidehelper to the possibility of punishmet when we do not punish the suicide himself? Is not the unqualified rule against helping suicide merely a remnant ofthe relous view?
Perhaps a parallel will make the point carer.
In 'Urbitania', a country lying on the other side of the 'iron curtain', a law has long forbidden citizens to emigrate. A group campigning for greater freedom has now gained assent to a prposal that this law should be repealed; but the repead is accompanied by a proviso that it shall still be an offence for any person to assist another to ate. Clearly, the proviso is a residue of the former repressive attitude on this subject. It assumes that emigration is anti-social and ouglit somehow to be discountenanced by law even if the emigrant himself is left untouched. Our presntlaw of suicide takes the same stance. If there are any valid reasons for using the law against a person who assists suicide, tese must be arguments of a p Il character: for example, that an unscrupulous adult might assist a ficlde adolescent to commit suicide, perhap for some fell purpose of his own. Certainly there are dang-rs that have to be provided against; but I do not pause to consider them in general, because what we are debating here is a very limited situation. We are debating the case of a patient suffering from a terminal illness who asks for speedy release: this case and this alone. We now acknowledge, as a society, that the patient may commit suicide without offending agpinst the law. Why, then, should not his parent, spouse or doctor be allowed to help him? And if the doctor is allowed to give the patient tablets to take, why cannot he imject the lethal dose into the patient if that course appears preferable? Morally, there is no difference between assisting suicide and killing another person with his consent. I have tried to show that this is a general question relating to the proper limits of the criminal law, not specifically a medical question. But legislation aimed to alter the present law as a practical matter naturally concentrates on the doctors, because it is they who have the knowledge and ability to perform mercy killing in a humane manner. Why do so many doctors resist the proposal ?
The proposal would not compel doctors to do anything. It would save them from prosecution if, prompted by humane feelings, they accelerated deathas some doctors say they do now.
We are told that not many dying patients would ask for euthanasia. This is doubtless true, but it is not a reason for forbidding euthanasia to those who do ask for it. Perhaps some people do not ask because they do not think there is any chance of getting the doctor to agree.
We are told that medical science has already conquered the problem of pain. This may be largely true, but not entirely so. The elderly arthritic, for example, suffers a great deal of pain without obtaining any adequate relief. Besides, it is not a question of pain only, but of all the other evils of old age and killing diseaseextreme weakness, incontinence, vomiting, slow suffocation through obstructed breathing, bed sores, and the sense of hopelessness of one's condition. Even if it is the case that the natural melancholy of the situation can be alleviated by euphorics, does that much improve matters? When the dying patient expresses a wish to have the process expedited, why should we assume that he is out of his mind, and, so far from granting his wish, merely treat him as for a morbid mental condition?
We are told that the doctor's function is to save or prolong life, not to take it. But this oversimplifies. In the debate on the first Euthanasia Bill in the House of Lords in 1936, Lord Dawson of Penn denied the view that the only duty of the doctor is to save life. In the present century, he said, medical opinion has come to hold that it is also the doctor's duty to relieve pain. In a striking passage he referred to what he called 'the gap', the period of waiting for death by a person burdened by incurable disease. Speaking for the medical profession, he said: 'There is in the aggegate an unexpressed growth of feeling that the shortening of the gap should not be denied when the real need is there. This is due, not to a diminution of courage, but rather to a truer conception of what life means and what the end of its usefulness deserves.'
Then we are told that no legislation is necessary because doctors can in fact speed their patient's passage, quite morally and legitimately, by the double effect of morphine. The morphine is given in increasing doses to overcome habituation, and these doses may eventually build up to one that produces respiratory failure. The doctor pretends to himself that he is only relieving pain, but hewell knows that the result is to speed the end. He may even deliberately accelerate the doses for this purpose, secure inthe knowledge that no one can prove his real motive. That, at least, has been the position. But it was always a precarious solution, dependent upon the accidental fact that morphine, the medically preferred analgesic, carried this sideeffect of depressing respiration. There was always the possibility that the doctor's opportunity for benevolent hypocrisy would be ended by the development ofan effective analgesic which did not produce respiratory depression; and claims have been made that drugs like dextromoramide and dihydrocodeine already fit this bill. Whether or not it has already happened, the time will surely come when the doctor who administers pure morphine in steadily mounting doses will be seen by the present law for a murderer, because the drug will have ceased to be medically justified.
When morphine can no longer be used in this way the medical profession will be compelled to face what has always been the real question: are you not sometimes compelled to end your patient's sufferings if you are acting in his interest and in accordance with the best dictates of your profession? And will you not need to have the law brought into accord with what will then be recognized medical practice?
The present position is not altogether without danger for doctors who follow what may well be the compelling promptings of their conscience. Perhaps the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions would be reluctant to investigate the case, but even a private person can by our law prosecute for murder. The doctor is therefore at the mercy of a vengeful relative. If a doctor were prosecuted and convicted, the judge would be compelled by law to pass a sentence of imprisonment; and there would in addition be the likelihood of disciplinary proceedings. But there is another and much more important argument against the 'do-nothing' attitude. Is it right to retain a law that no longer accords with our moral ideas? The law is to some extent the embodiment of the moral values of the community, and what is against the law tends to be put out of contemplation. The more timid souls will not break it, even if the bolder ones do. If we no longer think that mercy killing is wicked, we ought to see that the law registers this change of opinion.
There are only two medical procedures specifically prohibited or regulated by law: abortion and euthanasia. In every other medical field we 7 665
Proc. ray. Soc. Med. Volume63Jidy 1970 8 entrust doctors with a discretion. In the field of t , foreaWmple, dotors have wo*d out their ow s s: for cadaver transplants the trasplant team must not be the same as that in chawe of th donor, and death must be certified by two independent doctors, one of whom must be qualified for at least five years. Suppose that transplants, instead of being a modern development had been practised by our Anglo-Saxon forbears; in that case the practice would very likely have been forbidden by the early Church, and therefore by the law, using the same kind of arg e as Catholics use against contraception and sttion, namely that transplants are 'unnatural' and frustrate the dispositions of God. We should perhaps still be struggling to change the law on the subject. You can depend on it that the proposal for revising the law would be met by all the ingious practical objections that are now made against euthanasia. The fears would be legion: fear that possible donors would feel a mural obliation to volunteer to surrender a paired organ, or that a parent would feel a moral obligation to commit suicide to provide a child with a heart; doubt whether the donor, in view of the uncertainty of his own future, could give an effective consent; fear that patients would be killed by-medical 'vultures' in order to get their organs for some prestigious transplant; fear that grandfather will be pushed downstairs when it is discovered that lie bas the same tissue type as his iverish gandhild fear that people will sell their organs and then commit suicide in order to pay their debts or enrich their heirs; fear that people will be kept alive by transplants into their dotage in order to frustrate their heirs of their legtimate expectations. We know that in practice these thing do not happen; and if any of them threatens to happen we are confident that we can by some means or other deal with the particular evil: we do not have to forbid homografts altogether. But when you try to modify an existing law based on religious belief, some people resist the chage by invoking just these kinds of argument. The arguments seem to have sufficient plausibility to win acceptance by those who fear to make a change, or who are so conditioned by customary attitudes that they cannot contemplate a change.
What, then, is the legislative proposal? My own proposal would be a simple one: but I must emphasize that it applies only to patients who are suffering severe distress without prospect of relief. In these cases it should not be murder for a doctor, acting at the patient's request and with the concurrence of another doctor,'to accelerate the patient's death in good faith and for his benefit. Apart from some small formalities relating to the request I would not put in any other restrictions, leaving those, if any are req*uird, to medical pratice. As a laymen, I have every confidence that members of your pro ion will exercise the pemission I would gie you wisely and humanely. I think it very unlikely that the permission would be over-used: look at the fight you are putting up against being entrted with an explicit permission at all! The perm_ive law would much more likely be under-used. If any feared dangers did materialize the law could easily be repealed because no vested intees would be created by it.
In practice, I know, my simple measure would be met by many objections, many of them emanating from persons who would emphatifaly protest that they were not against voluntary euthasia as such. 'Safeguards' would be demanded; and as soon as you write any particular safeguard into the Bill the opposition will begin to criticize the safeguard without offering any alternative formula that they will support.
The history of reform efforts in the area shows this clearly. If you require the patient's writtn consent, opponents will say that the COet may be extorted or forged; if you then require the consent to be given before an official refere, they will say that this is bringing too much fomality into the sick-room; if you specify some lesser formality, they will say that the terminal patient is in no condition to form a judgment; if you provide that the patient shall give his consent much earlier, when he is quite well perhaps, they will say that there is no assurance that the patient afterwards remains of the sane min. is last objection, which was made to Lord Ra n's recent Bill, was a particularly captious one because the Bill itself provided that the consent could be revoked at any time. It is surely a fair inference that a patient who has made the euthanasia declaration and who has never revoked it remains of the same mind when he is approaching his natural end. Even if you are not certain at the last what his mind is, why should you attach more weight to that uncertainty than to his perfectly clear decision beforehand? I may perhaps mention here the kind of safeguard that I myself would think sufficient. The patient's request for euthanasia (made in a condition of extreme and irremediable distress) should be embodied in writing, signed by him if possible but otherwise acknowledged by him, in the presence of a doctor. If the request is accepted by the doctor, he must forward the document forthwith to the physician, matron or other person in charge of the hospital or registered nursing home where the patient is; if the patient is not in a hospital or registered nursing home the document should be notified andsent forthwith to the chief officer of police. After the lapse of a minimum of, say, ten hours the request must be reaffirmed bythe patient in the presence ofa second medical practitioner who must concur in the diagnosis of the patient's condition.
There is only one argument against voluntary euthanasia in these cases worthy of serious consideration, and that is the fear that a change in the law would put a distressing pressure on some old or dying people to accelerate their end out of consideration for their relatives and those who are looking after them. Although this is a serious argument, my own view is that it does not weigh against the other considerations. It is true that under my measure a patient may ask for euthanasia and through his insistence succeed in getting it because he does not want to continue to be a burden, perhaps for his young daughter who is looking after him. One hears sometimes of persons suffering from severe disability who commit suicide for this noble reason. Lord Soper in the Lords' debate on the recent Euthanasia Bill referred with admiration to the suicide of Captain Oates, whose object was to disembarrass Scott of his presence; and a cripple who commits suicide in order to set free his young wife or daughter may be just as deserving of our esteem. I should like to think that I myself would have the courage to do this in such circumstances, though I would certainly not blame anyone for not sacrificing himself. I do not believe that this question of consideration for one's family can be settled by rule, one way or the other. It is an immensely difficult human problem, and is surely best left to be settled by the patient himself, as one of the factors influencing his decision, but subject to the advice and support of his doctors which one knows would be forthcoming.
The President said that Lord Longford had written deeply regretting his inability to be present and stating that he hoped that the religious point of view would be put. Lord Longford himself happened to be a Roman Catholic, but was not of course suggesting that the Roman Catholic case against euthanasia was different from that which was believed in just as strongly by countless other Christians.
Sir George Thomson, speaking as a layman, said that his connexion with medicine and surgery had been entirely on the receiving end and this made him perhaps look at matters rather differently. Lord Platt had said that about 76 % of a sample of 1,000 doctors considered that medical men had helped their patients out of life, perhaps a little sub rosa. He would like to know what happened to the other 24%. It did not seem likely that the differences in general practice were so great that if 76% had found, presumably in a reasonable number of cases, that such action as this was humane, it could not have been so for the remaining 24 %. This brought him to his real pointthe helplessness of the patient, particularly poor patients and also patients in the hospital who had no say as to which doctor attended them. Unless they were unusually well educated they probably did not know what the whole thing was about; they were completely helpless and could not speak for themselves; they could not say how they wished to be treated or how not to be treated.
Sir George said he would like to think that the medical profession felt that, with the increase in the possibilities of keeping people alive, there was a great increase in their duty to make sure that they really took these factors into consideration. He had a feeling that doctors, without necessarily having a law, could do a great deal to remove the reasons which made so many people feel the extreme necessity for euthanasia in the form of a law.
Professor J M Hinton said that in considering the difficult problem of euthanasia there could be a conflict between two aspects of what doctors were trying to do. One aspect was to relieve suffering, and here doctors were very well aware that continued distress in terminal illness appeared useless. On the other hand, there were ethical reasons against making a positive contribution to a patient's death, even when doctors were conscious of their inability to cure. In such a conflict of different pressures it was a situation par excellence where other values regarding life and death, together with other views and prejudices, could enter in and perhaps distort judgment. Therefore, although as doctors it was right for them to discuss the vocational aspects of this dilemma, a scientific approach should also be borne in mind. It was necessary to find out to what extent terminal illness was so distressing that it should be curtailed. To what extent did dying individuals, or individuals enduring chronic illness, actually wish to have their lives curtailed ? Although difficult problems to explore, they could and should be investigated. Certainly there was evidence that at the present moment a proportion of people in terminal illness did suffer at sometime; the figures varied around 15-30%. This was in the so-called average sort of care. It might well be that the average care was not good enough.
If it could be proved that, in spite of all the help that could be given, a significant proportion of people continued to suffer, there would be a positive indication for voluntary euthanasia. But if, given facilities, skill and sympathy, the incidence of distress could be reduced to nil there would be no case on the basis of suffering.
The other aspect on which information was needed was whether the individual desired death.
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Professor Glanville Williams had said that people would express doubts about how much notice one should take of the patient who said he wished to die. Professor Hinton said that as a psychiatrist he was aware that one should not always take what a person said at its face value. He had, however, had the opportunity of discussing this aspect of attitude to death with quite a few people in terminal illness and gained some knowledge even if there was no simple answer. When talking to people who knew they were dyingand a very large proportion of people did knowone could not always gain from them a sincere consistent opinion of whether they wanted to die. They could hold one view at one time and .within a few sentences say quite opposite things: that they wanted to die, that they did not want to die; that they knew they were going, that they hoped they would survive.
Until there was more evidence on both these pointshow much a patient suffered and a clear indication of his willingness to die and acceptance of death, which would vary a great deal according to the physical distress he sufferedthe case for euthanasia was unproven.
Dame Albertine Winner said that she would not enter into the rights and wrongs of euthanasia, but it might perhaps be of some interest if she outlined the experience at a hospice which had on average one death a day. They had not yet, with one exception, been asked by a patient that his time should be shortened. She had no doubt whatever that the average patient did not wish to have the time shortened before he died. She did not think that this was because patients came to the hospice knowing that it was not very kindly disposed towards euthanasia, but because most people on the verge of dying did not really wish their time in this world to be shortened. She thought she could say that most of the patients were reasonably comfortable. Those with severe vomiting or breathlessness might be a problem and, to a very small extent, those with pain which could not be relieved were exceptions, but even these did not seek euthanasia. Of these patients euthanasia had been asked for by one young man with motor neurone disease, but he and his wife were now happy to be having the experience of his progressive disease.
The President asked what proportion of these patients would have such disturbances of consciousnessinsightthat they would not be in a position even to discuss such a matter.
Dame Albertine Winner said that percentages were very difficult to give; perhaps 5% (20 or 30 patients a year) at the outside would be unable to have an opinion.
Professor Erwin Stengel said that his interest in this problem derived from his studies on suicide. One often came across people who were sick and lonely, known to be incurable, and who would be the type to qualify for euthanasia. Some of them had made suicidal attempts, but almost invariably such patients went on living and proceeded towards dying in much the same way as others who had not tried to take their own lives.
His criticism of some of the presentations was that they ignored the changing attitudes to life and death to which Professor Hinton had referred. For instance, Lord Platt had said that he would sign a declaration for euthanasia to be administered if he had a terminal illness which at the time of his declaration made him feel he did not wish to carry on. But once a person became a patient his attitudes to illness, to life and to himself changed. That was why wards of incurables could present quite a happy atmosphere. The doctor who visited themand this was a mistake beginners often madethought: 'If I were one of them how should I feel? I should want euthanasia.' But if he were there as a patient his outlook would have completely changed. This factor tended to be overlooked by advocates of euthanasia.
Lord Platt had also said that for the man with aphasia life was not worth living, but how could one say that he should not live? Temporal lobe aphasics, unlike motor aphasics, were known to be unaware of their deficiency. They were complacent and might even appear happy.
Referring to the similarity of euthanasia with suicide, Professor Stengel said that again there had been neglect of important psychological differences. In almost every suicidal act a chance of survival was built in, but in euthanasia no such chance existed. Professor Glanville Williams had an image of suicide as a rational act of selfdestruction, which was not in keeping with the psychological realities. Even very determined suicidal acts were often made ineffective by the unconscious wish to survive, and sometimes the person changed his mind during the act.
The lack ofconsideration for the effect of illness and disability on the afflicted personalities was illustrated by Professor Glanville Williams's reference to the cripple where again the change of outlook and mentality had been completely ignored.
Sir John Richardson agreed with Professor Stengel that attempted suicides very often lived to lead perfectly normal and useful lives. He also concurred with all that Lord Platt had said up to and including the point of his demand for the right to say 'I will not have a form of treatment' such as having his heart restarted. That, he thought, was acceptable and was how doctors practised. In fact, Professor Glanville Williams's proposal, which was permissive and not particularly demanding of the doctor, really covered what was the majority practice in this country.
It was the 'on demand' aspect which worried him very much indeed and Lord Platt himself had pointed out that this was where the difficulty arose. It was easy to say five or twenty years before when one was feeling healthy that one did not wish to be a burden on the family; to say, as most doctors did, that they wanted to be told when they were going to diehe knew quite well they did not in the event, or very few of them did, neither did other patients.
All this in advance seemed very dangerous and he would have thought that the only demand to be countenanced would be that made by the patient at the time. Then the patient should be questioned repeatedly by wise people who knew how to assess answers given under varying stresses. He wondered how many would in fact ask for euthanasia. He thought that advances in medicine itself and improvement in what could be given would reduce the number to a very small one.
He also felt that there could be great difficulty about, for example, an aphasic patient. Lord Platt had said that when one saw the paralysed hopeless case who had not moved or spoken for months all knew that there could only be a fatal outcome. This was not always true. He knew of an example when it had not been. Legislators condemned hanging for many reasons, one of the most telling being that the wrong man might be hanged. Some patient could be wrongly destroyed.
Dr M H Pappworth said that he would like to raise three points. The first had been mentioned by Lord Plattthat the person with a serious head injury and who had irreversible brain damage should be submitted to euthanasia. The question he had asked repeatedly without obtaining a satisfactory answer was by what criteria could irreversible brain damage be diagnosed with any degree of certainty? Until recently it had been claimed that the electro-encephalogram was the complete answer, in spite of experts like Pampiglione and Margerison asserting the contrary. This was a question to which the leaders of the profession should be giving great thought in order to give guidance to lay people and doctors.
Secondly, he received the literature of the Euthanasia Society who claimed that they had a limited aim, namely, euthanasia for those who asked for it and where two doctors certified that the patient was hopelessly ill. Suppose that Lord Raglan's Bill was passed and that objective were achieved, would the Euthanasia Society then be satisfied or would they later make further demands, such as the involuntary euthanasia advocated by Lord Platt ?
His third point concerned Lord Brock's mention of the Nazis. In 1936 Hitler had demanded that the medical profession in Germany adopt a euthanasia plan; one of the first big measures which he passed was an anti-vivisection law, the second was his Euthanasia Act. Twenty leading members of the German medical profession, all associated with teaching hospitals, volunteered to kill selected people from the mental hospitals.
He was sure that this could happen even here.
Sir Geoffrey Organe thought Professor Glanville
Williams had been confused over one point, that voluntary euthanasia was practised now. He was quite certain that formal debate did not take place between doctor and patient leading to a formal decision to execute the patient. What happened was that if the patient was suffering more than the doctor thought he should suffer, he was helped on his way. Whether this was a good thing or not he did not know. He wished to refer to one further point which Lord Brock had underlined. At one time he had had to give evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment who were then trying to devise more humane means ofexecuting prisoners. They had discussed intravenous injections of pentothal and insulin and of pre-medicant drugs which would render the prisoner a little less apprehensive. He had been surprised at the reaction of his own colleagues, the anisthetists, who had been insistent that they would not be prepared to play any part in a process of execution, even in allaying suffering in connexion with that process. They were neither prepared to give an injection nor prescribe one; nor were they prepared to take part in the instruction of any warder in the art of intravenous injection of suitable agents. He thought that if euthanasia became more formal than it was now, and if affidavits had to be sworn before solicitors or magistrates with the consent of relatives, that there would be much more resistance on the part of doctors than there was at the moment. Dr Alexander Anderson raised two matters of education. First, 'How do we educate the public to live with the idea of death?' In medieval times the devil lay in the hedgerow and death was all around and people lived with itit was a natural phenomenon of life. But now people were educated to avoid death in ordinary conversation and in their daily attitudes.
Secondly, the education of the doctor: he thought that this was one of the training gaps which could be filled readily by instruction in the Proc. roy. Soc. Med. Volume 63 July 1970 philosophy of facing death. This necessary orientation had been ignored and was one that most doctors had to find out for themselves.
Lord Brock, replying to the discussion, said first of all that he was a little disappointed at the complete absence of discussion as to what was thought to be the doctor's attitude to this difficult matter.
He had noted that Professor Glanville Williams had quoted him as having said that the sole duty of a doctor was to prolong life. This was not what he had said. He had said that the chief duty of a doctor was concerned with his patient's welfare. He had been very careful not to say that his duty was to prolong life. He was concerned with the welfare of his patient and this might mean assistance towards death, but this was a matter which was surely so obvious that there was no reason why a collection of educated and experienced doctors should underline it. Everybody agreed that there were occasions when it was the doctor's proper duty to assist the patient to a comfortable end.
Professor Glanville Williams had also said that he (Lord Brock) was confused between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. He would suggest that Professor Williams was the one who was confused as to what they were talking about. The discussion was on euthanasia and this addition of the adjective 'voluntary' was, it was true, in the House of Lords' Bill. The danger attached to this was the next step, as Dr Pappworth had pointed out, when people would not be satisfied with this. That was why he had quoted the poem 'the Road to En-dor'. They would not be satisfied. If one had listened to the debate or had read Hansard, it would have been seen that half the people who spoke had not given it a thought that this should remain as voluntary euthanasia. They were wasting their time when they talked of the patient who was so ill that he had to be helped in the way that it was known that doctors did help patients. What concerned him was the reality of the fact that there were many other problems which would be settled by personal convenience or inconvenience. For example, granny was upstairs, occupying a bedroom which would have been useful. Those were the problems. What was one to do if there was a law enabling the doctor to destroy a patient provided oertain items laid down in legislation were satisfied? If a relative wanted granny killedand there were plenty of people sufficiently forceful to insist upon their wish to have her killed -must the doctor fill in a form? Where was the form obtained? Was a letter written to the Home Office, or did one go round to the Post Office? He knew that this might sound ludicrous, but these were practical factors. Somehow or other a form would have to be obtained, either from a doctor or from some central authority. It was then filled in, but was granny to be asked to sign it ?
He thought it was quite obvious that an important solution to the problem of the mental hospitals would be answered by euthanasia, not only by voluntary euthanasia but by involuntary euthanasia. He was quite sure that once voluntary euthanasia was agreed to, great pressure would be brought for consent to involuntary euthanasia.
Professor Glanville Williams said that he was puzzled by the attitude which some speakers had expressed, that doctors now would in Lord Brock's words give their patients assistance towards death. That was a studiedly ambiguous phrase and he did not know what it meant.
According to others who had contributed to the debate, it seemed that doctors did now accelerate their patient's end. At the same time, the attitude was: 'Do not change the law. Leave it to our discretion.' He found it very hard to understand how the members of a respectable professionas the medical profession undoubtedly wasshould wish to continue to be murderers which they were in law if this in fact was what they were doing. He thought their fears of legislation were unfounded. Legislation need not be cumbrous or mandatory, it need only give legality to what was already being done.
As to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, he knew that medical men did not want to tell their patients that they were dying. They did not want to ask for explicit consent. He was very happy to leave the doctor, if he was willing to take the responsibility, to despatch the patient without asking him, doing what it was extremely likely that the patient would desire if he knew the truth of the situation, but he knew that this could not be put into legislation. He knew, therefore, that legislation could not do very much, but at least it could do something in the voluntary field and he saw no danger whatsoever that legislation for voluntary euthanasia would ever be extended to allow killing otherwise than to relieve suffering. It was quite clear that everybody's opinion, his included, would be very much against that.
